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Abstract: After long arguments between positivism and falsificationism, the verification of universal 
hypotheses was replaced with the confirmation of uncertain major premises. Unfortunately, Hemple discovered the 
Raven Paradox (RP). Then, Carnap used the logical probability increment as the confirmation measure. So far, 
many confirmation measures have been proposed. Measure F among them proposed by Kemeny and Oppenheim 
possesses symmetries and asymmetries proposed by Elles and Fitelson, monotonicity proposed by Greco et al., and 
normalizing property suggested by many researchers. Based on the semantic information theory, a measure b* 
similar to F is derived from the medical test. Like the likelihood ratio, b* and F can only indicate the quality of 
channels or the testing means instead of the quality of probability predictions. And, it is still not easy to use b*, F, or 
another measure to clarify the RP. For this reason, measure c* similar to the correct rate is derived. The c* has the 
simple form: (a-c)/max(a, c); it supports the Nicod Criterion and undermines the Equivalence Condition, and hence, 
can be used to eliminate the RP. Some examples are provided to show why it is difficult to use one of popular 
confirmation measures to eliminate the RP. Measure F, b*, and c* indicate that fewer counterexamples’ existence is 
more essential than more positive examples’ existence, and hence, are compatible with Popper’s falsification 
thought.  
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1. Introduction 
A universal judgment is equivalent to a hypothetical judgment or a rule, such as “All ravens are 
black” is equivalent to “For every x, if x is a raven, then x is black”. Both can be used as a major premise 
for a syllogism. Deductive logic needs major premises; however, some major premises for empirical 
reasoning must be supported by inductive logic. Logical empiricism affirmed that a universal judgment 
can be verified finally by sense data. Popper said against logical empiricism that a universal judgment 
could only be falsified rather than be verified. After long arguments, Popper and most logical empiricists 
reached the identical conclusion that uncertain universal judgments or major premises could be 
confirmed by evidence [1,2].  
In 1945, Hemple [3] discovered the confirmation paradox or the Raven Paradox (RP). According to 
the Equivalence Condition (EC) in the classical logic, “If x is a raven, then x is black” (Rule I) is 
equivalent to “If x is not black, then x is not a raven” (Rule II). A piece of white chalk supports the Rule II, 
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and hence, also supports the Rule I. However, according to the Nicod Criterion (NC) [4] or Nicod-Fisher 
Criterion (NFC) (see Section 2.3 for details), a black raven supports the Rule I, a non-black raven 
undermines the Rule I, and a non-raven thing, such as a black cat or a piece of white chalk, is irrelevant to 
the Rule I. Hence, there exists a paradox between EC and NC or NFC.  
To quantize confirmation, both Carnap [1] and Popper [2] proposed their confirmation measures. 
However, only Carnap’s confirmation measures are famous. So far, researchers have proposed many 
confirmation measures [1,5-13]. The induction problem seemly have become the confirmation problem. 
To screen reasonable confirmation measures, Elles and Fitelson [14] proposed symmetries and 
asymmetries as desirable properties; Crupi et al. [8] and Greco et al. [15] suggested normalization (for 
measures between -1 and 1) as a desirable property; Greco et al. [16] proposed monotonicity as a 
desirable property. We can find that only measures F (proposed by Kemeny and Oppenheim) and Z among 
popular confirmation measures possess these desirable properties. Measure Z was proposed by Crupi et 
al. [8] as the normalization of some other confirmation measures. It is also called the certainty factor 
proposed by Shortliffe and Buchanan [7]. 
When the author of this paper [17] optimized the (fuzzy) truth functions using his semantic 
information method, he found that any truth function for binary classifications could be treated as the 
combination of a clear prediction’s truth function (with a value 0 or 1) and a tautology’s truth function 
(with a constant value 1). The combining proportion of the former optimized by a sampling distribution 
may be regarded as the confirmation measure. This measure is denoted by b*; it is similar to measure F 
and also possesses the above-mentioned desirable properties. 
In the medical society, Likelihood Ratio (LR) [18] is used to assess the quality of medical tests; 
positive LR, e.g., LR+, is used to assess the uncertain major premise “If x is positive, then x is infected”, 
where x is a person’s specimen or datum. Measures L, F, and b* are the functions of LR. LR changes 
between 0 and ∞; L changes between -∞ and ∞. Both LR and L cannot indicate the difference between a 
test and the best test (or the worst test) as well as F and b*. However, it is still not easy to use F, b*, or 
other measures to eliminate the RP.  
Recently, the author found that the problem with the RP is different from the problem with the 
medical test. LR, F, and b* indicate how good the testing means are instead of how good the probability 
predictions are. To clarify the RP, we need a confirmation measure that can indicate how good the 
probability predictions are. The confirmation measure c* is hence derived. We call c* a prediction 
confirmation measure and call b* a channel confirmation measure. The distinction between Channels’ 
confirmation and predictions’ confirmation is similar to yet different from the distinction between 
Bayesian confirmation and Likelihoodist confirmation [19]. Measure c* accords with the NFC and 
undermines the EC, and hence can be used to eliminate the RP.  
The main purposes of this paper are 1) to use a confirmation measure to eliminate the RP, and 2) to 
explain that confirmation and falsification may be compatible. 
The confirmation methods in this paper are different from popular methods since  
 b* and c* are derived by the semantic information method [17, 20] and the maximum 
likelihood criterion rather than defined.  
 confirmation and statistical learning mutually support so that the confirmation measures are 
used not only to assess major premises but also to make probability predictions.   
The main contributions of this paper are  
 It distinguishes two types of confirmation measures: 1) the channel confirmation measure, 
which is similar to LR and indicates how good a channel is and 2) the prediction confirmation measure, 
which is similar to accuracy (or the correct rate) and indicates how good a probability prediction is.  
 It provides measure c* that manifests NFC, and hence can be used to eliminate the RP. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 includes methods. It reviews existing 
confirmation measures and their screening; it also introduces how to use the semantic information 
method to derive new confirmation measures b* and c* with the medical test as an example. Section 3 
includes results. It provides equations with four examples’ numbers a, b, c, and d to express new 
confirmation measures for a major premise with different antecedents and seccedents. It also provides 
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some equations to explain relationships between F and b* and some examples to show the characteristics 
of new confirmation measures. Section 4 discusses why we can eliminate the RP by measure c*. It also 
discusses some conceptual confusions and misunderstandings in the popular confirmation methods and 
explains how new confirmation measures are compatible with Popper’s falsification thought. Section 5 
ends with conclusions. 
2. Methods 
2.1. To Review popular confirmation measures  
We use h1 to denote a hypothesis, h0 to denote its negation, and h to denote one of them. We use e1 as 
another hypothesis treated as the evidence of h1, e0 as its negation, and e as one of them. We use c(e, h) to 
represent a confirmation measure, which means the degree of inductive support. Note that c(e, h) here is 
used as in [8], where e is on the left, and h is on the right.  
The Popular confirmation measures include:    
D(e1, h1)=P(h1|e1)-P(h1) (Carnap, 1962 [1]),  
M(e1, h1) = P(e1|h1)- P(e1) (Mortimer, 1988 [5]),  
R(e1, h1)=log[P(h1|e1)/P(h1)] (Horwich, 1982 [6]),   
C(e1, h1)= P(h1, e1)- P(e1) P(h1) (Carnap,1962 [1]),  
1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1
1 1 1 1
[ ( | ) ( )] / [1 ( )],  as ( | ) ( ),
( , )
[ ( | ) ( )] / ( ),  otherwise
P h e P h P h P h e P h
Z h e
P h e P h P h
     ，          
 (Shortliffe and Buchanan, 
1975 [7], Crupi et al., 2007 [8]), 
S(e1, h1)= P(h1|e1)- P(h1|e0) (Christensen, 1999 [9]),  
N(e1, h1)= P(e1|h1)- P(e1|h0) (Nozik, 1981 [10]),  
L(e1, h1)=log[ P(e1|h1)/P(e1|h0)] (Good, 1984 [11]), and 
F(e1, h1)=[ P(e1|h1)- P(e1|h0)]/[ P(e1|h1)+ P(e1|h0)] (Kemeny and Oppenheim, 1952 [12]). 
There are more confirmation measures in [8,21]. F is also called l* [13], L [8], or k [21].  
Firstly, we need to clarify that confirmation is to assess what kind of evidence supports what kind of 
hypotheses. Let us have a look at the following three hypotheses:  
 Hypothesis 1: h1(x)=“x is elderly.” where x is a variable for an age and h1(x) is a predicate. An 
instance x=70 may be the evidence, and the truth value of proposition h1(70) should be 1. If 
x=50, the (fuzzy) truth value should be less, such as 0.5. Let e1=“x≥60”, true e1 may also be 
the evidence that supports h1 so that P(h1|e1)>P(h1), where P means logical probability. 
 Hypothesis 2: h1(x)=“If age x≥60, then x is elderly”, which is a hypothetical judgment, a 
major premise, or a rule. Note that x=70 or x≥60 is only the evidence of the consequence “x is 
elderly” instead of the evidence of the rule. The rule’s evidence should be a sample with many 
examples.  
 Hypothesis 3: e1→h1=“If age x≥60, then x is elderly”, which is the same as Hypothesis 2. 
The difference is that e1=“x≥60”; h1=“x is elderly”. The evidence is a sample with many 
examples like {(e1, h1), (e1, h0),…}, or a sampling distribution P(e, h), where P means 
statistical probability. 
Hypothesis 1 only has a truth function or logical probability between 0 and 1, which is ascertained 
by our definition or usage. Hypothesis 1 does not need to be confirmed. Hypothesis 2 or Hypothesis 3 
is what we need to confirm. The degree of confirmation is between -1 and 1. 
There exist two different understandings about c(e, h): 
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 Understanding 1: The h is the major premise to be confirmed, and e is the evidence that 
supports h; h and e are so used by Elles and Fitelson [14]. 
 Understanding 2: The e and h are those in rule e→h as used by Kemeny and Oppenheim [12]. 
The e is only the evidence that supports the conclusion h instead of the major premise e→h. 
Fortunately, although researchers understand c(e, h) in different ways, most researchers agree to use 
a sample including four types of examples (e1, h1), (e0, h1), (e1, h0), and (e0, h0) as the evidence to confirm 
a rule and to use the four examples’ numbers a, b, c, and d (see Table 1) to construct confirmation 
measures. The following statements are based on this common view.  
  
 Table 1. The numbers of four types of examples for confirmation measures 
 e0 e1 
h1 b a 
h0 d  c 
 
The a is the number of the example (e1, h1). For example, e1=“raven” (“raven” is a label or the 
abbreviate of “x is a raven”) and h1=“black”; a is the number of black ravens. Similarly, b is the number 
of black non-raven things; c is the number of non-black ravens; d is the number of non-black and 
non-raven things.   
To make the confirmation task clearer, we follow Understanding 2 to treat e→h =“if e then h” as 
the rule to be confirmed and replace c(e, h) with c(e→h). To research confirmation is to construct or 
select the function c(e→h)=f(a, b, c, d).  
 To screen reasonable confirmation measures, Elles and Fitelson [14] proposed the following 
symmetries: 
 Hypothesis Symmetry (HS): c(e1→h1)=-c(e1→h0) (two seccedents are opposite), 
 Evidence Symmetry (ES): c(e1→h1)=-c(e0→h1) (two antecedents are opposite), 
 Commutativity Symmetry (CS): c(e1→h1)=c(h1→e1), and 
 Total Symmetry (TS): c(e1→h1)=c(e0→h0). 
They conclude that only HS is desirable; the other three symmetries are not desirable. We call this 
conclusion as the Symmetry/Asymmetry requirement. Their conclusion is supported by most researchers. 
Since TS is the combination of HS and ES, we only need to check HS, ES, and CS. According to this 
symmetry and asymmetry requirement, only L, F, and Z among the measures mentioned above are 
screened out. It is uncertain whether N can be ruled out by this requirement [15]. See [14,22,23] for more 
discussions about the symmetries.   
Greco et al. [15] proposed monotonicity as a desirable property. If f(a, b, c, d) does not decrease 
with a or d and does not increase with b or c, then we say that f(a, b, c, d) has the monotonicity. L, F, and 
Z have this monotonicity, whereas D, M, N do not have. If we further require that c(e→h) are normalizing 
(between -1 and 1) [8,12], then only F and Z are screened out. There are also other properties are 
discussed [15,19]. One is Logicality, which means c(e→h)=1 without counterexample and c(e→h)=-1 
without positive example. We can also screen out F and Z using the Logicality requirement. Another is 
Maximality/Minimality, which means c(e1→h1) should be maximal iff c=b=0 and minimal iff a=d=0. 
However, F does not satisfy Maximality/Minimality requirement [21]. The reason is that b=0 is not 
necessary to make F(e1→h1)=1, and c=0 is not necessary to make F(h1→e1)=1. It is easy to find that 
Maximality/Minimality is compatible with Commutativity Symmetry. 
Some researchers pay attention to the Maximality/Minimality requirement for different applications. 
For example, Glass [21] proposed two confirmation measures of association rule interestingness, which 
satisfies Maximality/Minimality requirement and dissatisfies the Symmetry/Asymmetry requirement. 
The author of this paper pays attention to the Symmetry/Asymmetry requirement instead of the 
Maximality/Minimality requirement for confirming major premises. 
Consider the medical test, such as the test for HIV (Human Immunodeficiency Virus). Let 
e1=“positive” (e.g., “x is positive”, where x is a specimen), e0=“negative”, h1=“infected” (e.g., “x is 
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infected”), and h0=“uninfected”. Then the positive likelihood ratio is LR+= P(e1|h1)/P(e1|h0), which 
indicates the reliability of the rule e1→h1. L and F have the one-to-one correspondence with LR: 
L(e1→h1)=log LR+;             (1) 
F(e1, h1)=(LR+-1)/(LR++1).       (2) 
Hence, L and F can also be used to assess the reliability of the medical test. In comparison with LR 
and L, F indicates the distance between the test (F) and the best test (1) or the worst test (-1). However, 
LR can be used for the probability predictions of diseases more conveniently [18].  
2.2. Shannon’s channel and Semantic channel of medical tests 
 Consider the medical test. The relationship between h and e is shown in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1. The relationship between Positive/Negative and Infected/Uninfected in the medical test  
The x∈U denotes a specimen or a testing datum; x’ is the partitioning boundary of testing data. 
Classifications for elder people, good watermelons, and junk emails are similar. When we classify people 
into elderly people and non-elderly people, x may be any age, x’ may be age 60. The h1 is the true label 
“elderly” in a sample, and e1 is the classified label “elderly” according to x. To optimize classifications, 
we may use the maximum posterior probability criterion, which is equivalent to the maximum 
correctness criterion, or the maximum likelihood ratio criterion. The author has proved that the 
maximum likelihood ratio criterion is equivalent to the maximum mutual information criterion [24]; we 
may use an iterative algorithm to achieve the maximum mutual information classifications [17]. 
Figure 2 shows the relationship between h and x by two posterior probability distributions P(x|h0) 
and P(x|h1) and the relationship between e and x by two crisp sets E0 and E1.  
 
Figure 2. Four conditional probabilities for LR+, LR-, and Shannon’s channel P(e|h) 
The two areas that the two function curves cover may be treated as the elements of two fuzzy sets θ1 
and θ0 [17]. Let E1→θ1 =“If x is in E1, then x is in θ1”. Then we can regard E1→θ1 as e1→h1 for 
intuitionistic understanding.  
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In the medical test, P(e1|h1) is called sensitivity, and P(h0|e0) is called specificity. They ascertain a 
Shannon channel [25], as shown in Table 2. 
Table 2. The sensitivity and specificity ascertain a Shannon’s Channel P(e|h) 
 Negative e0 Positive e1 
Infected h1 P(e0|h1)=1-sensitivity P(e1|h1)=sensitivity 
Uninfected h0 P(e0|h0)=specificity P(e1|h0)=1-specificity 
 
Next, we define the semantic channel [17]. Let e1(h) be a predicate. Its truth function is T(θe1|h),  
where θe1 a fuzzy subset on {h0, h1}. We may regard e1(h) as the combination of believable and 
disbelievable parts (see Figure 3). The truth function of the believable part is T(E1|h)∈{0,1}. The 
disbelievable part is a tautology, whose truth function is always 1. Then we have truth functions of 
predicates e1(h) and e0(h): 
T(θe1|h)= b1’ +b1’ T(E1|h);    T(θe0|h)= b0’ +b0’ T(E0|h).    (3) 
where b1’ is the proportion of the disbelievable part and also the truth value T(θe1|h0) of e1 for given 
counter-instance h0 as the condition. 
 
Figure 3. Truth function T(θe1|h) is regarded as the believable part (b1) plus the disbelievable part 
(b1’=1-|b1|). 
The four truth values form a semantic channel, as shown in Table 3. 
Table 3. The semantic channel ascertained by b1’ and b0’ for the medical test 
 e0 (negative) e1 (positive) 
h1 (infected) T(θe0|h1)=b0’ T(θe1|h1)=1 
h0 (uninfected) T(θe0|h0)=1 T(θe1|h0)=b1’ 
 
2.3. Semantic information formulas and the Nicod-Fisher criterion 
We can obtain the posterior probability distribution P(h|θe1) of h from P(h) and T(θe1|h) by the 
semantic Bayes’ formula [17] 
1 1 1
1 1 1 1 0
( | ) ( ) ( | ) / ( )  
( ) ( ) ( | ) ( ) ' ( ),
e e e
e i e i
i
P h P h T h T
T P h T h P h b P h
  
 

  
，
     (4) 
where T(θe1) is the logical probability of predicate e1(h). The distinction and relationship between 
logical probability and statistical probability are discussed in [17].  
 According to the semantic information G theory [17,20], the semantic information conveyed by e1 
about h is 
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1 1
1
1
( | ) ( | )( ; )= log log .
( ) ( )
i e e
e
i e
P h T hI h
P h T
 

        (5) 
The average semantic information is  
1 1
1 1
1 1 1
0 01
( | ) ( | )( ; ) ( | ) log ( | ) log
( ) ( )
e i i e
e i i
i ie i
T h P hI H P h e P h e
T P h
 
 
   ,   (6) 
where H is a random variable taking value h; P(hi|e1) is the conditional probability from the sample.  
We now consider the relationship between the likelihood and the average semantic information. 
 Let D be a sample {(h(t), e(t))|t = 1 to N; h(t)∈{h0, h1}; e(t)∈{e0, e1}}, which includes two 
sub-samples or conditional samples H0 with label e0 and H1 with label e1. When N data points in D come 
from Independent and Identically Distributed (IID) random variables, we have the log-likelihood 
1
1
1 1 1 1 1
0
1
1 1 1 1
0
( ) log ( | )= log ( (1), (2),..., ( )| ) log ( | )
                    ( | ) log ( | )= - ( | ).
iN
e e e i e
i
i i ej e
i
L P P h h h N P h
N P h e P h N H H
   
 


 



H
 (7) 
where θe1 is a fuzzy set and can also be treated as a model or a model’s parameters; N1i is the number of 
the example (hi, e1) in D; N1 is the size of H1. Comparing the above two equations, we have 
1
1 1 1 1 1
0
( ; ) ( ) / ( | ) log ( )e e i
i
I H L N P h e P h 

  .     (8) 
Since the second term on the right side is constant, the maximum likelihood criterion is equivalent 
to the maximum average semantic information criterion. It is easy to find that a positive example (e1, h1) 
increases the average log-likelihood L(θe1)/N1; a counterexample (e0, h1) decreases it; examples (e0, h0) 
and (e0, h1) with e0 are irrelevant to it. 
The Nicod criterion about confirmation is that a positive example (e1, h1) supports rule e1→h1; a 
counterexample (e1, h0) undermines e1→h1. No reference exactly indicates if Nicod affirmed that (e0, h1) 
and (e0, h1) are irrelevant to e1→h1. If Nicod did not affirm, we can add this affirmation to the criterion. 
We can call the corresponding criterion the Nicod-Fisher criterion, since Fisher proposed Maximum 
Likelihood (ML) estimation. 
3. To derive two confirmation measures b* and c* 
3.1. To derive channel confirmation measure b* 
Logical Bayesian Inference (LBI) based on the semantic information G theory provides the 
method of optimizing truth functions by sampling distributions [17]. It concludes that as 
P(h|θe1)=P(h|e1), the average semantic information I(H; θe1) reaches its maximum. Meanwhile, the truth 
function T*(θe1|h) is proportional to the transition probability function [25], e.g., T*(θe1|h)∝P(e1|h). 
Hence  
1
1 1 1 0
'*1 = .
( | ) ( | )
b
P e h P e h
          (9) 
where b1’* is the optimized degree of disbelief and is called the degree of disconfirmation of rule e1→h1. 
From the above equation, we can obtain   
b1’*=P(e1|h0)/ P(e1|h1)=1/LR+,       (10) 
where P(h1|e1)≥ P(h0|e1). We call   
b1*=1-b1’*=[ P(e1|h1)-P(e1|h0)]/P(e1|h1)        (11) 
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the degree of confirmation of the rule e1→h1. Consider P(h1|e1)<P(h0|e1). We have  
b1*=b1’*-1=[P(e1|h0)-P(e1|h1)]/P(e1|h0).       (12) 
Combining the above two formulas, we obtain 
1 1 1 0
1 1 1
1 1 1 0
( | ) ( | ) 1* *( ) .
max[ ( | ), ( | )] max( ,1)
P e h P e h LRb b e h
P e h P e h LR


        (13) 
In the same way, we obtain  
0 0 0 1
0 0 0
0 0 0 1
( | ) ( | ) 1* *( ) .
max[ ( | ), ( | )] max( ,1)
P e h P e h LRb b e h
P e h P e h LR


        (14) 
where LR-=P(h0|e0)/P(h1|e0) is the negative likelihood ratio. Using HS, we can obtain b*(e1→h0)= 
-b*(e1→h1) and b*(e0→h1)= -b*(e0→h0). 
 Compared with F, b* is better for probability predictions. For example, from b1*>0 and P(h), we 
obtain  
P(h1|θe1)= P(h1)/[ P(h1)+b1’*P(h0)]= P(h1)/[1-b1*P(h0)].    (15) 
If b1*=0, then P(h1|θe1)=P(h1). If P(h1|θe1)<0, then we can make use of HS to have 
b0*=b1*(e1→h0)=|b1*(e1→h1)|. Then we obtain 
P(h0|θe1)= P(h0)/[ P(h0)+b0’*P(h1)]= P(h0)/[1-b0*P(h1)].    (16) 
We can also obtain b1*=2F1/(1+F1) from F1=F(e1→h1) for P(h1|θe1), but the calculation of probability 
predictions with F1 is a little complicated. 
So far, it is still problematic to use b*, F, or another measure to handle the RP. For example, the 
increments of b*(e1→h1) caused by d plus 1 and a plus 1 may be similar, which means that a piece of 
white chalk can support “Ravens are black” as well as a black raven. Hence b* and F do not accord with 
NFC. Z does not too. 
Why does not measure b* and F accord with NFC? The reason is that the likelihood L(θe1) is related 
to P(h), whereas b* and F are irrelevant to P(h). 
3.2. To derive prediction confirmation measure c* 
Statistics not only uses Likelihood Ratio (LR) to indicate how reliable a testing means (as  a 
channel) is but also uses the Correct Rate (CR) to indicate how reliable a probability prediction is. Like 
LR, F and b* cannot indicate the quality of a probability prediction. Most other measures have similar 
problems as mentioned by [9]. 
For example, a testing method of HIV [26] has sensitivity P(e1|h1)=0.917 and specificity 
P(e0|h0)=0.001. We can calculate b1*=0.9989. When the prior probability of h1 changes, predicted 
probability P(h1|θe1) according to Eq. (15), which is also called positive predictive value, changes with 
the prior probability of h1, as shown in Table 4. We can obtain the same results using the classical Bayes’ 
method. 
Table 4. Predictive probability P(h1|θe1) changes with prior probability P(h1) as b1*=0.9989. 
 Safe group Common people High-risky group 
 P(h1) 0.0001 0.002 0.1 
 P(h1|θe1) 0.0084 0.65 0.99 
 
Data in Table 4 shows that b* or F cannot indicate the quality of probability predictions. Therefore, 
we need to use P(h) to construct a confirmation measure that is similar to the CR.  
We now treat P(h|θe1) as the combination of a useful part with proportion c1 and a useless part with 
proportion c1’, as shown in Figure 4. We call c1* the degree of belief of e1→h1 as a prediction.  
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Figure 4. Likelihood function P(h|θe1) may be regarded as a useful part plus a useless part.  
As the prediction accords with the fact, e.g., P(h|θe1)= P(h|e1), c1 becomes c1*. The degree of 
disconfirmation for predictions is  
c’*(e1→h1)=min( P(h0|e1)/P(h1|e1), P(h1|e1)/P(h0|e1)).    (17) 
Further, we have  
1 1 0 1
1 1
1 1 0 1
1 1 1
1 1 1 1 1 1
( | ) ( | )*( )
max( ( | ), ( | ))
2 ( | ) 1 2 1 .
max( ( | ),1 ( | )) max( ,1 )
P h e P h ec e h
P h e P h e
P h e CR
P h e P h e CR CR
 
  
 
   (18) 
where CR1=P(h1|θe1)=P(h1|e1) is the correct rate of rule e1→h1. This correct rate means that the 
probability of H=h1 as x∈E1 is CR1. Letting both the numerator and denominator of Eq. (18) be 
multiplied by P(e1), we obtain 
1 1 0 1
1 1 1
1 1 0 1
( , ) ( , )* *( ) = .
max( ( , ), ( , )) max( , )
P h e P h e a cc c e h
P h e P h e a c
       (19) 
The sizes of four areas covered by two curves in Figure 5 are proportional to a, b, c, and d.   
 
Figure 5. The numbers of positive examples and counterexamples for c*(e0→h0) (see the left side) 
and c*(e1→h1) (see the right side). 
Using the similar method, we obtain  
0 0 1 0
0 0 0
0 0 1 0
( , ) ( , )* *( ) = .
max( ( , ), ( , )) max( , )
P h e P h e d bc c e h
P h e P h e d b
       (20) 
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Making use of HS or Seccedent Symmetry (SS), we can obtain c*(e1→h0)= -c*(e1→h1) and 
c*(e0→h1)= -c*(e0→h0).  
In Figure 5, the sizes of the two areas covered by two curves are P(h0) and P(h1), which are 
different. If P(h0)=P(h1)=0.5, then the prediction confirmation measure c* is equal to the channel 
confirmation measure b*. 
 We can also use c* for probability predictions. As c1*>0, according to Eq. (18), we have   
 1 1 1 1 1( | ) 1/ (1+ '*) 1/ (2 *).eP h CR c c          (21) 
If c*(e1→h1)=0 then P(h1|θe1)=0.5. If c*(e1→h1)<0, we may make use of HS or SS to have 
c0*=c*(e1→h0)=|c*(e1→h1)|, and then make probability prediction: 
0 1 0
1 1 0 1 0 0
( | ) 1/ (2 *)
( | ) 1 ( | ) (1 *) / (2 *).
e
e e
P h c
P h P h c c

 
 
    
， 
    (22) 
 We may define another prediction confirmation measure by replacing “max( ) ” with “+”: 
1 1 0 1
1 1 1 1 1 0 1
1 1 0 1
1 1 0 1
1
( | ) ( | )= *( ) ( | ) ( | )
( | ) ( | )
( , ) ( , )= .
( )
F F
P h e P h ec c e h P h e P h e
P h e P h e
P h e P h e a c
P e a c
   

 

  (23) 
The cF* is convenient for probability predictions as P(h) is certain. There is  
1 1 1 1
0 1 1 1
( | ) (1+ *) / 2;     
( | ) 1 (1 *) / 2.
e F
e F
P h CR c
P h CR c


 
   
       (24) 
However, when P(h) is variable, we should use b* with P(h) for probability predictions. 
 It is easy to prove that c*(e1→h1) and cF*(e1→h1) possess all the above-mentioned desirable 
properties. 
3.3. Converse channel/prediction confirmation measures b*(h→e) and c*(h→e)  
Greco et al. [19] divide confirmation measures into  
 Bayesian confirmation measures with P(h|e) for e→h,  
 Likelihoodist confirmation measures with P(e|h) for e→h,  
 converse Bayesian confirmation measures with P(h|e) for h→e, and  
 converse Likelihoodist confirmation measures with P(e|h) for h→e.  
Similarly, this paper divides confirmation measures into  
 channel confirmation measure b*(e→h),  
 prediction confirmation measure c*(e→h),  
 converse channel confirmation measure b*(h→e), and  
 converse prediction confirmation measure c*(h→e). 
We now consider c*(h1→e1). Suppose that P(x|h1) is the age distribution of people called “elderly”. 
If one knows P(x|h1) and is asked to explain the meaning of P(x|h1) in natural language, he may explain 
“If one is called elderly, maybe he/she is over 60 years old”. This kind of explanation can be abstracted 
as h1→e1. The confirmation measure c*(h1→e1) is a converse prediction confirmation measure. The 
positive examples’ proportion and counterexamples’ proportion can be found in the upside of Figure 5. 
Then we have 
1 1 0 1
1 1
1 1 0 1
( | ) ( | )*( ) = .
max( ( | ), ( | )) max( , )
P e h P e h a bc h e
P e h P e h a b
      (25) 
The correct rate reflected by c*(h1→e1) is sensitivity or true positive rate P(h1|e1). The correct rate 
reflected by c*(h0→e0) is specificity or true negative rate P(h0|e0).  
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Consider the converse channel confirmation measure b*(h1→e1). Now the source is P(e) instead of 
P(h). We may swap e1 with h1 in b*(e1→h1) or a with d in f(a, b, c, d) to obtain  
 * 1 1 1 0
1 1
1 1 1 0
( | ) ( | )( ) = .
( | ) ( | ) ( ) ( )
P h e P h e ad bcb h e
P h e P h e a bb d a c 
  
 
     (26) 
where ˅ is the max operator in fuzzy logic and is used to replace max( ). There are also four types of 
converse channel/prediction confirmation formulas with a, b, c, and d (see Table 8). Due to HS or SS, 
there are eight types of converse channel/prediction confirmation formulas altogether.    
3.4. Eight confirmation formulas for different antecedents and seccedents  
Table 5 and Table 6 shown the positive examples’ and counterexamples’ proportions needed by b* 
and c*.  
Table 5. Four proportions for calculating b*(e→h) and c*(e→h) 
 
 
 
Table 6. Four proportions for calculating b*(h→e)和 c*(h→e) 
 
 
 
 
Table 7 provides four types of confirmation formulas with a, b, c, and d for rule e→h, where 
function max() is replaced with the operator ˅. These confirmation measures are related to the false 
report rates of the rule e→h. 
Table 7. Channel/prediction confirmation measures expressed by a, b, c, and d. 
 b*(e→h) (for channels, refer to Figure 2) c*(e→h) (for predictions, refer to Figure 5) 
e1→h1 1 1 1 0
1 1 1 0
( | ) ( | ) =
( | ) ( | ) ( ) ( )
P e h P e h ad bc
P e h P e h a c d c a b 
 
 
 1 1 0 1
1 1 0 1
( | ) ( | )
( | ) ( | )
P h e P h e a c
P h e P h e a c
 
 
  
e0→h0 0 0 0 1
0 0 0 1
( | ) ( | ) =
( | ) ( | ) ( ) ( )
P e h P e h ad bc
P e h P e h d a b c db 
 
 
 0 0 1 0
0 0 1 0
( | ) ( | ) =
( | ) ( | )
P h e P h e d b
P h e P h e d b


  
Table 8 includes four types of confirmation measures for h→e. These confirmation measures are 
related to the missing report rates of the rule h→e.  
Table 8. Converse channel/prediction confirmation measures expressed by a, b, c, and d. 
 b*(h→e) (for converse channels) c*(h→e) (for converse predictions, 
refer to Figure 5) 
h1→e1 1 1 1 0
1 1 1 0
( | ) ( | ) =
( | ) ( | ) ( ) ( )
P h e P h e ad bc
P h e P h e a b d a cb 
 
 
 1 1 0 1
1 1 0 1
( | ) ( | ) =
( | ) ( | )
P e h P e h a b
P e h P e h a b


  
h0→e0 0 0 0 1
0 0 0 1
( | ) ( | ) =
( | ) ( | ) ( ) ( )
P h e P h e ad bc
P h e P h e d a c c b d 
 
 
 0 0 1 0
0 0 1 0
( | ) ( | )
( | ) ( | )
P e h P e h d c
P e h P e h d c
 
 
  
 
 e0 (negative) e1 (positive) 
h1 (infected) P(e0|h1)=b/(a+b) P(e1|h1)=a/(a+b) 
h0 (uninfected) P(e0|h0)=d/(c+d) P(e1|h0)=c/(c+d) 
 e0 (negative) e1 (positive) 
h1 (infected) P(h1|e0)=b/(b+d) P(h1|e1)=a/(a+c) 
h0 (uninfected) P(h0|e0)=d/(b+d) P(h0|e1)=c/(a+c) 
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Each of the eight types of confirmation measures in Table 7 and Table 8 has its 
hypothesis-symmetrical or seccedent-symmetrical form. Therefore, there are 16 types of function f(a, b, 
c, d) altogether for confirmation. 
In prediction and converse prediction confirmation formulas, the conditions of conditional 
probabilities are the antecedents of rules so that the confirmation measures only depends on the two 
numbers of positive examples and counterexamples. Therefore, these measures accord with NFC.   
If we change “˅” into “+” in f(a, b, c, d), measure b* becomes measure bF*=F, and measure c* 
becomes measure cF*. For example,  
cF*(e1→h1)=(a-c)/(a+c).         (27) 
4. Results 
4.1. Relationship between measure b* and measure F 
 Measure b* is like measure F. Measure b* has all the above-mentioned desirable properties as 
well as measure F. The two measures changes with LR, as shown in Figure 6. 
 
Fig. 6. Measures b* and F change with LR 
Measure F has four confirmation formulas for different antecedents and seccedents [8]:  
1 1 1 0
1 1 1 1
1 1 1 0
( | ) ( | )( ) = *( )
( | ) ( | ) 2 F
P e h P e h ad bcF e h b e h
P e h P e h ad bc ac
    
  
 ,   (28) 
1 1 1 0
1 1 1 1
1 1 1 0
( | ) ( | )( ) = = *( )
( | ) ( | ) 2 F
P h e P h e ad bcF h e b h e
P h e P h e ad bc ab
   
  
,    (29) 
0 0 0 1
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1
( | ) ( | )( ) = = *( )
( | ) ( | ) 2 F
P e h P e h ad bcF e h b e h
P e h P e h ad bc bd
   
  
,    (30) 
0 0 0 1
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1
( | ) ( | )( ) = = *( )
( | ) ( | ) 2 F
P h e P h e ad bcF h e b h e
P h e P h e ad bc cd
   
  
.    (31) 
F is equivalent to bF* and similar to b*.  
4.2. Relationships between Prediction Confirmation Measures and some medical test’s indexes  
Channel confirmation measures are related to likelihood ratios, whereas Prediction Confirmation 
Measures (PCMs), including converse PCMs, are related to correct rates and false rates in the medical 
test.  
To help us understand the significances of PCMs in the medical test, Table 9 shows that each 
PCM is related to which correct rate and which false rate. 
  Table 9. PCMs are related to correct rates and false rates in the medical test [27] 
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PCM  Correct rate positively related to c* False rate negatively related to c* 
c*(e1→h1) P(h1|e1): positive predictive value  P(h0|e1): false discovery rate   
c*(e0→h0) P(h0|e0): negative predictive value  P(h1|e0): false omission rate  
c*(h1→e1) P(e1|h1): sensitivity or true positive rate  P(e0|h1): false negative rate 
c*(h0→e0) P(e0|h0): specificity or true negative rate P(e1|h0): false positive rate  
 
The false rates related to PCMs are the false report rates of the rule e→h, whereas the false rates 
related to converse PCMs are the missing report rates of the rule h→e.   
4.3. Using three examples to compare various confirmation measures 
We use two examples to explain that measure b* is more sensitive to counterexamples than to 
positive examples (see Figure 7).  
 
(a) Example 1: Positive examples’ proportion is 0.1; Counterexample’s proportion is 0.01. 
 
(b) Example 2: Positive examples’ proportion is 1; Counterexample’s proportion is 0.9. 
Figure 7. How positive examples and counterexamples’ proportions affect b*(e1→h1) 
In example 1, b*(e1→h1)=(0.1-0.01)/0.1=0.9, which is very big. In example 2, 
b*(e1→h1)=(1-0.9)/1=0.1, which is very small. The two examples indicate that fewer counterexamples’ 
existence is more essential to b* than more positive examples’ existence. F, c*, and cF* also possess 
this characteristic. However, most confirmation measures do not possess this characteristic.  
We further suppose P(h1)=0.2 and n=1000. The degrees of confirmation with different 
confirmation measures for the above two examples are shown in Table 10, where the base of log for R 
and L is 2. Table 10 also includes Example 3 (e.g., Ex. 3), whose P(h1) is 0.01. Example 3 reveals the 
difference between Z and b* (or F).  
Table 10. Three examples to show the differences between different confirmation measures. 
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Ex. a, b, c, d D M R C Z S N L F b* c* 
1 20, 180, 8, 792 .514 .072 1.84 .014 .643 .529 .09 3.32 .818 .9 0.8 
2 200, 0, 720, 80 .017 .08 0.12 .016 .022 .217 .1 .152 .053 .1 -.722 
3 10, 0, 90, 900 .09 .9 3.32 .009 .091 .1 .091 3.46 .833 .91 -.9 
 
Data for Example 1 and 2 show that L, F and b* give Example 1 much higher rating than Example 
2, whereas M, C, and N give Example 2 higher rating than Example 1. 
For Examples 2 and 3, in which c>a, only the values of c*(e1→h1) are negative. The negative 
values should be reasonable for assessing probability predictions when counterexamples are more than 
positive examples.  
The data for Example 3 show that when P(h0)=0.99>>P(h1)=0.01, Z is very different from F and 
b* because F and b* are independent of P(h). 
4.4 How D, LR+, F, and c* are affected by Δa and Δd  
Table 11 shows the degrees of confirmation calculated with four different measures. First, we 
suppose a=d=20 and b=c=10 to calculate the four degrees of confirmation. Next, we only replace a with 
a+Δa (Δa =10) to calculate the four degrees. Last, we only replace d with d+Δd (Δd=10) to calculate 
them.  
Table 11. How D, LR+, F, and c* are affected by Δa and Δd  
 f(a, b, c, d)  
 
a=d=20 
b=c=10 
Δa=10  Δd=10 Δf/Δd>Δf/Δa? 
D(e1→h1) a/(a+c)-(a+b)/n 1/6 5/28 5/21 Yes 
LR+ [a/(a+b)]/[c/(c+d)] 2 9/4 3 Yes 
F(e1→h1) (ad-bc)/(ad+bc+2ac) 1/3 5/13 5/11 Yes 
c*(e1→h1) (a-c)/max(a, c) 1/2 2/3 1/2 No 
 
The cause of Δf/Δd>Δf/Δa for D, LR, and F is that Δd can evidently decrease P(h1) and P(e1|h0). 
5. Discussions 
5.1. To clarify the Raven Paradox (RP) 
To clarify the RP, some researchers including Hemple [3] affirm the EC and deny the NFC; some 
researchers, such as Scheffler and Goodman [28], affirm the NFC and deny the EC. There are also some 
researchers do not fully affirm the EC or the NFC.  
First we consider measure F to see if we can use it to eliminate the RP. The difference between 
F(e1→h1) and F(h0→e0) is that their counterexamples are the same, yet, their positive examples are 
different (in Eqs. (28) and (31), 2ac and 2cd in the two denominators are different). As d increases to 
d+Δd, F(e1→h1) and F(h0→e0) unequally increase. Therefore, 
 though measure F denies the EC, it still affirms that F(e1→h1) and F(h0→e0) are positively 
related; 
 Measure F does not accord the NFC. 
Measure b* is similar to F. The conclusion is that measures F and b* cannot eliminate our 
confusion about the RP.  
After inspecting many different confirmation measures from the perspective of the rough set theory, 
Greco et al. [15] conclude that NC (e.g., NFC) is right, but it is difficult to find a suitable measure that 
accords with NC. However, many researchers still believe that the NC is incorrect; the NC accords with 
our intuition because c(e1→h1) evidently increases with a and slightly increases with d. After comparing 
15 
 
 
different confirmation measures, Fitelson and Hawthorne [29] believe that the LR may be used to explain 
that a black raven can confirm more than a non-black non-raven thing.  
Unfortunately, Table 11 shows that the increment of D(e1→h1), LR+, or F(e1→h1) caused by Δd is 
bigger than that caused by Δa in this case. Therefore, these measures cannot be used to explain that a 
black raven can confirm much more than a non-black non-raven thing.  
Nevertheless, measure c* is different. Since c*(e1→h1)=(a-c)/(a˅c) and c*(h0→e0)=(d-c)/(d˅c), the 
EC does not hold, and measure c* accords with the NFC very well. Hence, the RP does not exist anymore 
according to measure c*. 
5.2. To distinguish statistical probability and logical probability 
A hypothesis or a label’s Logical Probability (LP) is the probability in which the hypothesis or the 
label is judged to be true, whereas its Statistical Probability (SP) is the probability in which it is 
selected. Suppose that ten thousand people go through a door. For everyone denoted by x, entrance 
guards judge “if x is elderly”. If two thousand people are judged to be elderly, then the LP of the 
predicate “x is elderly” is 2000/10000=0.2. If the task of entrance guards is to select a label for 
everyone with one of four labels: “Child”, “Youth”, “Adult”, and “Elderly”, there may be one thousand 
people who are labeled “Elderly”. The SP of “Elderly” should be 1000/10000=0.1. Why are not two 
thousand people are labeled “Elderly”? The reason is that some elderly people are labeled “Adult”. LP 
of a tautology is 1, whereas its SP is almost 0 in general because a tautology is rarely selected. SP is 
normalized (the sum is 1), whereas LP is not normalized in general. Because of this reason, we should 
use two different symbols, such as “P” and “T”, to distinguish SP and LP. The hybrid of LP and SP may 
produce subjective probability, such as P(h|θj) in Eq.(4). To calculate subjective or semantic 
information, we need subjective probability or LP [17]. To calculate degrees of confirmation, we need 
SP. 
5.3. Selecting hypotheses and confirming rules: two tasks from the view of statistical learning   
Researchers have noted the similarity between most confirmation measures and information 
measures. One explanation [30] is that information is the average of confirmatory impact. However,  
this paper gives a different explanation as follows.  
There are three tasks in statistical learning: label learning, classification, and reliability analysis. 
There are similar tasks in inductive reasoning: 
 1) Induction. It is similar to label learning. For uncertain hypotheses, label learning is to 
train a likelihood function P(x|θj) or a truth function T(θj|x) by a sampling distribution [17]. 
The Logistic function often used for binary classifications may be treated as the truth function.   
 2) Hypothesis selection. It is similar to classification according to different criteria.  
 3) Confirmation. It is similar to reliability analysis. The classical methods are to provide 
likelihood ratios and correct rates (including false rates).  
Classification and reliability analysis are two different tasks. Similarly, hypothesis selection and 
confirmation are two different tasks.  
In statistical learning, classification depends on the criterion. The often-used criteria are the 
maximum posterior probability criterion, which is equivalent to the maximum correctness criterion, 
and the maximum likelihood criterion, which is equivalent to the maximum semantic information 
criterion [17]. The classifier for binary classifications is  
1 1 0 1 0
0
,  if ( | ) ( | ), or ( | ) ( | );
( )
,  otherwise.                                                      
e P x P x P x P x
e x
e
     

   (32) 
After the above classification, we may use information criterion to assess how well ej is used to 
predict hj: 
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( | ) ( | )
( ; )= ( ; ) log log
( ) ( )
= log ( | ) log ( )=log ( | ) log ( )
= log ( , ) log[ ( ) ( )].
j j j j
j ej j j
j j
j j j j j j
j j j j
P h e P e h
I h I h e
P h P e
P h e P h P e h P e
P h e P h P e
  
 

     (33) 
With information amounts I(hi; θej) (i, j=0,1), we can optimize the classifier:  
  0 0 1 1* ( ) arg max[ ( | ) ( ; )+ ( | ) ( ; )]
j
j ej ej
e
e f x P h x I h P h x I h   .   (34) 
The new classifier will result in new Shannon’s channel P(e|h). The maximum mutual information 
classification can be achieved by repeating Eqs. (33) and (34) [24,17].  
With the above classifiers, we can make prediction ej=“x is hj” according to x. To tell information 
receivers how reliable the rule ej→hj is, we need the likelihood ratio (LR) to indicate how good the 
channel is or the correct rate to indicate how good the probability prediction is. Confirmation is similar. 
We need to provide a confirmation measure similar to LR, such as F or b*, and a confirmation measure 
similar to the correct rate, such as c* or cF*. The difference is that the confirmation measures should 
change between -1 and 1. 
 The main distinction between predictions’ information assessment and rules’ confirmation is that 
information assessment uses an information measure to assess every prediction of using e to predict h 
separately (many times), whereas confirmation uses a confirmation measure and many examples with e 
and h as facts to assess a rule one time. To calculate subjective or semantic information, we need 
subjective probability or logical probability [17]. To calculate degrees of confirmation, we need 
statistical probability. 
In statistical learning, information receivers make probability predictions according to ej, LRj, and 
P(h) or according to ej and the corresponding correct rate. In inductive reasoning, the receivers make 
probability predictions according to ej, b*(ej→hj), and P(h), or according to ej and c*(ej→hj).      
According to above analyses, it is easy to find that confirmation measures D, N, R, and C are more 
like information measures for assessing and selecting predictions instead of confirming rules. Z is their 
normalization [8]; it seems between an information measure and a confirmation measure. However, 
confirming rules is different from assessing predictions; it needs the proportions of positive examples 
and counterexamples and is similar to calculating likelihood ratios or correct rates. 
Confirmation is often explained as assessing the impact of the evidence on the hypothesis, or the 
impact of the premise on the consequence of a rule [14, 19]. However, this paper has a little different 
point of view that confirmation is to assess how well a sample or sampling distribution supports a 
major premise or a rule; the impact on the rule may be made by newly added examples (see the 
following section).  
5.4. About incremental confirmation  
Since one can use one or several examples to calculate the degree of confirmation with a 
confirmation measure, many researchers call their confirmation as incremental confirmation [14,15]. 
There are also researchers who claim that we need absolute confirmation [31]. This paper supports 
absolute confirmation. 
The problem with incremental confirmation is that the degrees of confirmation calculated are 
often bigger than 0.5 and are irrelevant to our prior knowledge or a, b, c, d that we knew before. It is 
unreasonable to ignore prior knowledge. Suppose that the logical probability of h1=“x is elderly” is 0.2; 
the evidence is x=65 or x>60; the conditionally logical probability of h1 is 0.9. With measure D, the 
degree of confirmation is 0.9-0.2=0.7, which is very big. 
 In function f(a, b, c, d) for F, b* and c*, the numbers a, b, c, and d should be those of all examples 
including past and current examples. A measure f(a, b, c, d) should be an absolute confirmation measure. 
Its increment should be   
Δf= f(a+Δa, b+Δb, c+Δc, d+Δd) - f(a, b, c, d).      (35) 
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If only d increases to d+Δd and d>>Δd, then Δf/Δd must be very small. For example, if there 10 
black ravens, 1 non-black raven, and 100 non-black non-raven things, then we have 
c*(e1→h1)=(a-c)/(a˅c)=0.9  and c*(h0→e0)=(d-c)/(d˅c)=0.99. The increment Δf caused by Δa=1 is 
10/11-9/10=0.0091; the increment Δf caused by Δd=1 is 100/101-99/100=0.0001. The former is 91 
times the latter.  It can be seen that the increment of the degree of confirmation brought about by a 
new example is closely related to the number of old examples. 
The absolute confirmation requires that sample size n is big enough, that each example is 
generated independently, and that all examples are representative. If a, b, c, and d are very small, the 
degree of confirmation calculated is unreliable. We need to replace the degree of confirmation with the 
degree interval of confirmation, such as [0.5, 1] instead of 1.  
5.5. To distinguish a major premise’s evidence and its consequence’s evidence 
The evidence for the consequence of a syllogism is the minor premise, whereas the evidence for 
confirming a major premise or a rule is a sample or a sampling distribution P(e, h). In some 
researchers’ studies, e is used sometimes as the minor premise, and sometimes as an example or a 
sample; h is used sometimes as the consequence, and sometimes as the major premise. Researchers use 
c(e, h) or c(h, e) instead of c(e→h) because they need to avoid the contradiction between the two 
understandings. However, if we distinguish two types of evidence, it has no problem to use c(e→h). We 
only need to emphasize that the evidence for the major premise is the sampling distribution P(e, h) 
instead of e. 
If h is used as a major premise and e is used as the evidence (such as in [5]), ¬e is puzzling because 
there are four types of examples instead of two. Suppose h=p→q and e is one of (p, q), (p, ¬q), (¬p, q), 
and (¬p, q). If  (p, ¬q) is the counterexample and other three examples (p, q), (¬p, q) and (¬p, ¬q) are 
positive examples, which support p→q, then (¬p, q) and (¬p, ¬q) should also support p→¬q because of 
the same reason. However, according to HS or SS, it is unreasonable that the same evidence supports 
both p→q and p→¬q. In addition, e is a sample with many examples in general. A sample’s negation or a 
sample’s probability is also puzzling.    
Fortunately, though many researchers say that e is the evidence of a major premise h, they also 
treat e and h as the antecedent and the seccedent of a major premise because, only in this way, one can 
calculate the probabilities or conditional probabilities of e and h for a confirmation measure. Why, then, 
should we replace c(e, h) with c(e→h) to make the task clearer? In the following, we can see that h used 
as a major premise will result in misunderstanding the above symmetries.  
5.6. Is Hypothesis Symmetry (HS) or Seccedent Symmetry (SS) desirable? 
Elles and Fitelson defined HS by c(e, h)=-c(e, ¬h). Actually, it means c(x, y)=-c(x, ¬y) for any x and 
y. Similarly, Evidential Symmetry (ES) is Antecedent Symmetry (AS), which means c(x, y)=-c(¬x, y) for 
any x and y. Since e and h are not the antecedent and seccedent of a major premise from their point of 
view, they could not say AS and SS. Consider that c(e, h) becomes c(h, e). According the literal meaning 
of HS, one may misunderstand HS as shown in Table 12.   
Table 12. Misunderstood HS and ES 
 HS or SS ES or AS 
Misunderstood HS c(e, h)=-c(e,¬h) c(h, e)= -c(¬h, e) 
Misunderstood ES c(h, e)=-c(h,¬e) c(e, h)= -c(¬e, h) 
 
For example, the misunderstanding happens in [8,19], where c(h, e)=-c(h, ¬e) is called ES. 
However, it is actually HS [14] or SS. In [19], the authors think that F(H, E) (where the right side is the 
evidence) should have HS, whereas F(E, H) should have ES. However, this “ES” does not accord with 
the original meaning of ES in [14]. Actually, both F(H, E) and F(E, H) possess HS or SS. The more 
serious thing because of the misunderstanding is that [18] concludes that ES and EHS (e.g., c(H, 
E)=c(¬H,¬E)), as well as HS, are desirable, and hence, measures S, N, and C are particularly valuable.  
The author of this paper approves the conclusion of Elles and Fitelson about symmetries and 
asymmetries that only HS (SS) is desirable. Therefore, it is necessary to make clear that e and h in 
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c(e, h) are the antecedent and seccedent of the rule e→h. To avoid the misunderstanding, we had 
better replace c(e, h) with c(e→h) and use “AS” and “SS” instead of “ES” and “HS” .  
5.7. About Bayesian confirmation and Likelihoodist confirmation  
Measure D proposed by Carnap is often referred to as the standard Bayesian confirmation measure. 
The above analyses, however, show that D is only suitable as a measure of selecting hypotheses instead 
of a measure of confirming major premises. Carnap opened the direction of Bayesian confirmation, but 
his explanation of D easily lets us confuse a major premise’s evidence (a sample) and a consequence’s 
evidence (a minor premise). 
Greco et al. [19] call confirmation measures with conditional probability p(h|e) Bayesian 
confirmation measures, those with P (e|h) Likelihoodist confirmation measures, and those for h→e 
converse Bayesisn/Likelihoodist confirmation measures. This division is very enlightening. However, 
the division of confirmation measures in this paper does not depend on symbols, but on methods. The 
optimized proportion of the believable part in the truth function is the channel confirmation measure b*, 
which is similar to the Likelihood Ratio (LR), reflecting how good the channel is; the optimized 
proportion of the believable part in the likelihood function is the prediction confirmation measure c*, 
which is similar to the correct rate, reflecting how good the probability prediction is. The b* may be 
called the logical Bayesian confirmation measure (because it is derived with Logical Bayesian 
Inference [17]), although P(e|h) may be used for b*. The c* may be regarded as the likelihoodist 
confirmation measure, although P(h|e) may be used for c*.  
This paper also provides converse channel/prediction confirmation measures for rule h→e. 
Confirmation measures b*(e→h) and c*(e→h) are related to false report rates, whereas converse 
confirmation measures b*(h→e) and c*(h→e) are related to missing report rates.  
4.8. About the certainty factor for probabilistic expert systems 
The Certainty Factor (CF) was proposed by Shortliffe and Buchanan for a backward chaining 
expert system MYCIN [7]. It indicates how true an uncertain inference h->e is. The relationship between 
the CF and the measure Z is CF(h→e )=Z(e→h) [32]. 
As pointed out by Heckerman and Shortliffe [32], the CF method has been widely adopted in 
rule-based expert systems, it also has its theoretical and practical limitations. The main reason is that the 
CF method is not compatible with statistical probability theory. They believe that the belief-network 
representation can overcome many of the limitations of the CF model, that the CF model is simpler, and 
that it is possible to combine both to develop simpler probabilistic expert systems.  
 Measure b*(e1->h1) is related to the believable part of the truth value of proposition e1(h1). It is 
similar to CR(h→e). The differences are that b*(e1->h1) is independent of P(h), where as CR(h→e) is 
related to P(h), and that b*(e1->h1) is compatible with statistical probability theory, whereas CR(h→e) is 
not. 
 Is it possible to use measure b* or c* as the certainty factor to simplify belief-networks or 
probabilistic expert systems? This question is worth to be explored. 
5.9. How confirmation measures F, b*, and c* are compatible with Popper’s falsification thought 
Popper affirms that a counterexample can falsify a universal hypothesis or a major premise. 
However, for an uncertain major premise, how do counterexamples affect its degree of confirmation? 
Confirmation measures F, b*, and c* can reflect the importance of counterexamples. Table 10 contains 
two examples. In Example 1, the proportion of positive examples is small, and the proportion of 
counterexamples is still less so that the degree of confirmation is big. This example shows that to 
improve the degree of confirmation, it is not necessary to increase the conditional probability P(e1|h1) 
(for b*) or P(h1|e1) (for c*). In Example 2, although the proportion of positive examples is big, the 
proportion of counterexamples is not small, so that the degree of confirmation is very small. This 
example shows that to raise degree of confirmation, it is not sufficient to increase the posterior 
probability. It is necessary and sufficient to decrease the relative proportion of counterexamples.  
Popper affirms that a counterexample can falsify a universal hypothesis, which can be explained 
that for the falsification of a universal hypothesis, it is essential to have no counterexample. Now for the 
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confirmation of an uncertainly universal hypothesis, we can explain that it is essential to have fewer 
counterexamples. It can be seen that confirmation measures F, b*, and c* are compatible with Popper's 
falsification thought.  
Scheffler and Goodman [28] proposed selective confirmation based on Popper's falsification 
thought. They believe that black ravens support "raven→black" because they undermine "raven → 
non-black", and hence, support the opposite hypothesis "raven→black". Their reason why non-black 
ravens support "raven→non-black" is because non-black ravens undermine the opposite hypothesis 
"raven→black". However, they did not provide the corresponding confirmation measure. Measure 
c*(e1→h1) is what they need. 
6. Conclusions 
Using the semantic information and statistical learning methods and taking the medical test as an 
example, this paper has derived two confirmation measures b*(e →h) and c*(e →h). The measure b* is 
similar to the measure F proposed by Kemeny and Oppenheim, and can reflect the channel 
characteristics of the medical test like Likelihood Ratio (LR), indicating how good a testing means is. 
Measure c*(e→h) is similar to the correct rate but varies between - 1 and 1. Both b* and c* can be used 
for probability predictions, and b* is suitable for predicting the probability of disease when the prior 
probability of disease is changed. Measures b* and c* possess symmetries and asymmetries proposed by 
Elles and Fitelson [14], monotonicity proposed by Greco et al. [15], normalizing property (between -1 
and 1) suggested by many researchers.  
This paper has shown that measure c* definitely denied the Equivalence Condition and exactly 
reflected Nicod-Fisher Criterion, and hence, could be used to eliminate the Raven Paradox. The new 
confirmation measures b* and c* as well as F indicate that fewer counterexamples’ existence was more 
essential than more positive examples’ existence, therefore, b* and c* were compatible with Popper's 
falsification thought. The new confirmation measures support absolute confirmation instead of 
incremental confirmation.  
It is possible to use measure b* or c* as the certainty factor to simplify belief-networks, which is 
worth to be explored. When the sample is small, the degree of confirmation calculated by any 
confirmation measure is not reliable, and hence, the degree of confirmation should be replaced with the 
degree interval of confirmation. The specific method needs further studies. 
 
Supplemental Material: Excel File for Data in Table 10 and Table 11 
This file can be downloaded from http://survivor99.com/lcg/Table10-11.xlsx. We can test different confirmation 
measures by changing a, b, c, and d. 
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